E.Z. v. Coler: Can the Constitution Protect Our Children? by DiSalvatore, Carol
Pace Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 1 Fall 1986
Cable Television and Communications Issue
Article 5
September 1986
E.Z. v. Coler: Can the Constitution Protect Our
Children?
Carol DiSalvatore
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol DiSalvatore, E.Z. v. Coler: Can the Constitution Protect Our Children?, 7 Pace L. Rev. 159 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/5
Notes and Comments
E.Z. v. Coler: Can the Constitution Protect
Our Children?
I. Introduction
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly
provide for a right of privacy,1 the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the existence of such a right in the penumbras of the first,
fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.2 Society, on the
other hand, has always assumed that individuals have a right to
their privacy. Both the traditional sanctity attributed to the
home by the courts and the right to familial privacy vest in the
family a strong interest in the privacy of the home and the daily
affairs taking place therein. To what extent, however, does the
Constitution, according to judicial interpretation, protect this
right to privacy?
In E.Z. v. Coler,3 the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois upheld warrantless searches of suspected victims
of child abuse and their homes. These searches were triggered by
telephone calls made to a hotline operated by the Illinois De-
partment of Children and Family Services4 (hereinafter DCFS).
The body searches and home searches,6 which took place with-
1. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734-35 (2d ed. 1978) ("The oldest constitutional right
to privacy is that protected by the Fourth Amendment's restriction on governmental
searches and seizures.").
3. 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
4. DCFS is the state agency responsible for receiving and investigating cases of al-
leged child abuse and neglect. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2057.3 (1980).
5. The term "body search" refers to:
a situation where a DCFS investigative worker removes or rearranges clothing
or causes same to be removed or rearranged from a child reported to be the sub-
ject of child abuse or neglect a portion of or all of the child's clothing so as to
permit a visual inspection of the child's body.
Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1548 n.2.
6. The term "home search" refers to "entering, examining, inspecting or viewing any
1
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out warrants, were authorized by DCFS procedures. Acknowl-
edging that the application of the fourth amendment was trig-
gered by the searches in question, the court purported to engage
in a balancing test of the interests involved. This balancing test,
however, was virtually one-sided - the court chose to elevate
the importance of the state's interest in protecting dependent
children from harm at the hands of a parent or caretaker and
then to summarily dismiss any analysis of the importance of the
family's interest in the privacy of the home.
This purported balancing test led the court to conclude that
the searches performed by the DCFS caseworkers did not violate
the fourth amendment rights of the parents or the children. In
light of fourth amendment jurisprudence, this case is significant
in its analysis of the nature of the searches themselves and in its
determination of the reasonableness of the searches.
Part II of this Note provides the framework of fourth
amendment analysis regarding searches and the standards gov-
erning their reasonableness. Part III discusses the factual back-
ground of E.Z. v. Coler and sets forth an overview of the proce-
dures followed by the DCFS caseworkers. Part IV analyzes the
memorandum opinion of the district court with particular em-
phasis on the court's characterization of the searches in question
and its reliance on Wyman v. James.' Part V of this Note con-
cludes that while the state's interest in protecting the health and
safety of dependent children is a significant one, the court's
analysis of the particular type of search conducted served to ob-
scure, rather than to clarify, fourth amendment analysis of
searches of a noncriminal nature. In classifying the searches of
the bodies of the suspected victims and their homes as "admin-
istrative," the court avoided imposing traditional fourth amend-
ment standards of protection and thereby de-emphasized the
significance of the intrusion on the families' rights to privacy in
their homes and in their persons. The decision leaves open the
question of what standards of protection, if any, exist for
room or area in a person's dwelling other than the readily observable areas in the imme-
diate vicinity of the place in which an interview of the occupants is being conducted." Id.
7. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes 62-69, 259-63.
8. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1555-56.
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searches of a noncriminal and non-regulatory nature under the
fourth amendment.
II. Background
A. What is a Search?
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'
Clearly, the protections of this amendment are triggered when
one or both events take place - either a search or a seizure.
Despite the general agreement as to the fundamental purposes
of the fourth amendment, problems arise in the application of
its protections."0 Application hinges upon a determination that a
search or a seizure did take place in a particular situation;"
however, a foolproof test for making such a determination does
not yet exist." Although the Supreme Court has not taken "a
literal or mechanical approach to the question of what may con-
stitute a search or seizure,"1 3 over the years, the Court has been
guided by various principles in its application of the fourth
amendment. In Silverman v. United States,'4 the Court, focus-
ing on location, determined that the fourth amendment is impli-
cated when there has been a physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area.'5 A few years later, in Katz v. United
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
11. For application of the fourth amendment to "searches" see infra text accompa-
nying notes 15-20. For application of the fourth amendment to "seizures," see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (A seizure, for purposes of the fourth amendment, occurs
"when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.").
12. Camara, 387 U.S at 528.
13. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962).
14. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
15. The term "constitutionally protected areas" has included: persons (Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)); hotel rooms (Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964));
apartments (Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964)); garages (Taylor v. United States,
1986]
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States, 6 the Court shifted its focus of analysis by declaring that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 1 1 7 With
this approach to the fourth amendment, the focus of inquiry be-
came the person who was the subject of the search and whether
this person had exhibited a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched. 8
In order to invoke the protections of the fourth amendment,
the expectation of privacy must be one which society would rec-
ognize as reasonable. 9 More recently, the Court reiterated the
principle that a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment occurs when the government intrudes upon an individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy. 20 Despite the Supreme Court's
attempts at providing a definition of a search, ultimately, the
factual circumstances of each case will determine whether the
fourth amendment has been implicated.
A major aspect of fourth amendment jurisprudence is de-
rived from the historical circumstances surrounding the origin of
the amendment: Constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures are generally construed liberally2 in favor
286 U.S. 1 (1932)); business offices (United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932));
stores (Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)); and warehouses (See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967)).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 351. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1966) ("[T]he princi-
pal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property .. ").
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
21. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932) (An affidavit setting forth facts
tending to show that the dwelling described was used as a manufactory of intoxicating
liquors but which states no facts from which a sale is necessarily inferred, is insufficient
to support the issuance of a warrant.). See also Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210
(1932) (The Court advocated liberal construction of constitutional guarantees in a case
involving a search warrant issued pursuant to the National Prohibition Act. The Act
provided that the warrant to search for intoxicating liquors became void at the expira-
tion of ten days from the date of its issuance. The Court held that after this period
expired, the warrant could not be revived on the basis of the original affidavit merely by
redating and reissuing it.); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (Where, pur-
suant to a warrant, defendants were arrested in a designated room for conspiracy to sell,
possess and transport intoxicating liquors, and the room was not alleged to have been a
place of manufacture, sale or storage of liquor, a search of the room was unconstitu-
tional.); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (In reversing a conviction for
unlawful possession of counterfeit "strip" stamps, the court stated "[a] search prose-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/5
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of the individual to safeguard the right of privacy. 22 Such an ap-
proach in interpreting the fourth amendment serves to prevent
impairment of the protection it extends.23 A liberal construction
is urged to "prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual de-
preciation' of the rights secured by the amendment, by im-
perceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistak-
enly over-zealous executive officers."'2 In Boyd v. United
States, 5 the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring the
production of a certain document in court for inspection by the
government's attorney was unconstitutional. 2" The Court advo-
cated liberal construction of the fourth amendment by declaring
that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing... by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to
the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed. '2 7
B. Development of the Fourth Amendment in a Criminal
Context
The overriding function of the application of the fourth
amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity from un-
cuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.");
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (The Court held that "the secret tak-
ing or abstraction, without force, by a representative of any branch or subdivision of the
Government of the United States, of a paper writing of evidential value only belonging
to one suspected of crime and from the house or office of such person... " violates the
fourth amendment.); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (The compulsory
production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him or to
forfeit his property is within the scope of the fourth amendment.) ("A close and literal
construction [of the amendments] deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to grad-
ual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.").
22. See Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464; Byars, 273 U.S. at 29 (A state search warrant
based on information alleging that affiant "had good reason to believe and did believe
the defendant had in his possession intoxicating liquors and instruments and materials"
used in the manufacture of such liquors, could not, under the fourth amendment, sustain
a federal search of defendant's house.).
23. Grau, 287 U.S. at 128. See supra note 21.
24. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304 (The fourth amendment was violated when a govern-
mental official, aware that defendant was conspiring to defraud the government, made a
"friendly" visit to defendant's home to seize his papers.).
25. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. Id. at 634-35.
27. Id. at 635.
5
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:159
warranted intrusion by the state.18 Traditionally, the most ex-
cessive kinds of intrusions occurred in searches of the person
and the home.2 9 Due to the substantial intrusiveness inherent in
such searches, they must be authorized by a valid warrant"0 or
judged according to a probable cause standard.31 "The sanctity
of privacy interests in the home requires no less than a judicial
officer's determination of when such interests must yield to
those of the government." '32
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). While upholding the taking of a
blood sample by a physician, at police direction, over the objection of the suspect, the
Court acknowledged that the administration of the blood tests "plainly constitute[d]
searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the
meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment." Id. at 767. Therefore, despite the Court's holding
that the fourth amendment was not violated:
It bears repeating, however, that [the Court] reach[es] this judgment only on the
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society. That [the Court] today hold[s] that the Constitution does not
forbid the States [sic] minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions,
or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. at 772.
29. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 140 (1925) "[Tlhe maxim that 'a man's
home is his castle' does not include the full scope of the Fourth Amendment. It likewise
protects the persons, and effects, wherever they may be, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("In none is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home .... ); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886) ("It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .. "); Illinois Migrant Council v.
Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[Plrivacy interests protected by the
fourth amendment are never stronger than when the search of a home is at issue.").
30. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior [judicial approval] are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment .... ) (emphasis in original). See also Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (requiring a search warrant, absent exigent circumstances or
consent, to search a third party's house for the subject of an arrest warrant); Payton, 445
U.S. 573 (prohibiting a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony arrest); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531-32
(1967) (The fourth amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of a personal residence; such an administrative inspection cannot
be justified on the grounds that it makes minimal demands on occupants.).
31. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances before the officer are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been
committed." Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). See also Locke v. United States,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 342 (1813).
32. Evans, Constitutional Restraints on Residential Warrantless Arrest Entries:
More Protection for Privacy Interests in the Home, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 25 (1982).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/5
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The impetus behind the formulation of the fourth amend-
ment stemmed from the reaction against the "evils of the use of
the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the
Colonies.... [The fourth amendment] was intended to protect
against invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life,' from searches under indiscriminate general author-
ity."'33 Under a general warrant, "an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a
fact committed. ' 34
Among the jurists who declared the invalidity of general
warrants was Sir Matthew Hale. 35 Although the King and Par-
liament had disregarded Hale's views, the judiciary became the
driving force behind the abolition of the general warrant. 36 The
statutory authority to issue general warrants ceased with the
end of the Printing Act in 1694; nevertheless, the secretaries of
state continued to issue these warrants in cases dealing with se-
ditious libel.3 7 An early English case, Wilkes v. Wood,38 involved
the issuance of a general warrant for the arrest of John Wilkes
and his accomplices, and for seizure of their papers. Wilkes had
been publishing a pamphlet series, North Briton, which vio-
lently attacked the government. Denouncing the warrant, Chief
Justice Pratt told the jury that "[t]o enter a man's house by vir-
tue of a nameless warrant in order to procure evidence is worse
than the Spanish inquisition, a law under which no Englishman
would wish to live an hour . . . . " On the question of general
warrants, Pratt declared that "[i]f such a power is truly invested
in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it cer-
tainly may affect the person and property of every man in this
kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject."'40
33. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S 294, 301 (1967) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
34. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (quoting H. COMMAGER, Doc-
UMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 104 (8th ed. 1968)).
35. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 27 (1966).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (1763).
39. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1405 (1763).
40. Id. at 1167.
1986]
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Another opponent of the writs of assistance and general
warrants, James Otis, denounced these warrants in 1761 as "the
worst instance of arbitrary power, the most destructive of Eng-
lish liberty, that ever was found in an English law book." '41 A
landmark case in this area, Entick v. Carrington,42 decided in
1765, determined that English law did not allow the officers of
the Crown to break into a citizen's home with a general warrant
to search for evidence of libel.43
Along with general warrants, the writs of assistance were re-
curring points of contention in the Colonies." The practice of
issuing writs of assistance to revenue officers, empowering them
in their discretion to search suspected places for smuggled
goods, was offensive to the colonists - particularly "the
merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were
inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue
measures."
4 5
Ultimately, America's response to the practice of issuing
general warrants was the fourth amendment.46 The purpose of
the amendment was to limit the arbitrary power of the govern-
ment inherent in these warrants by protecting against unreason-
able searches and seizures.17
"[D]uring the century following the adoption of the Federal
Constitution and its first ten amendments only a few cases in-
volving interpretation of the Fourth Amendment reached the
Supreme Court. 418 However, as the jurisdiction of the United
States broadened to include such criminal matters as the sale of
narcotics and intoxicating liquors, the fourth amendment be-
came one of the most prominent and litigated provisions of the
Bill of Rights. 49
41. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 59 (1937).
42. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1763).
43. Id. at 1063-76.
44. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
45. Id.
46. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977).
47. See generally LASSON, supra note 41.
48. LASSON, supra note 41, at 106.
49. Id.
[Vol. 7:159
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C. Civil-Criminal Distinction
Due to the early development of the fourth amendment in a
criminal context, the Supreme Court had held that the amend-
ment did not apply to a civil proceeding for the recovery of a
debt.50 Lower federal courts followed the Supreme Court's lead
and refused to extend the amendment's protections to civil ac-
tions. 1 This treatment of the amendment led to the develop-
ment of the civil-criminal distinction. In Frank v. Maryland,52
although the majority held that an inspection by a municipal
health official did not constitute a "search" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, there was a strong dissent by Justice
Douglas advocating the application of the amendment. The ma-
jority in Frank restricted its application of the fourth amend-
ment to situations involving evidence of criminal activity on the
ground that "it was on the issue of the right to be secure from
searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions ...
that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought."53 Jus-
tice Douglas, however, supported the application of the amend-
ment to all searches and found no basis for the civil-criminal
distinction: "The Court misreads history when it relates the
Fourth Amendment primarily to searches for evidence to be
used in criminal prosecutions. '54 Justice Douglas stressed that
the "fallacy in maintaining that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect criminals only was emphasized by Judge
Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little: '55
The argument is wholly without merit, preposterous in fact. The
50. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 285 (1855) (where a distress warrant was issued by the United States treasury, au-
thorizing a levy for the satisfaction of a debt to the government, the Court determined
that the fourth amendment has no relation to the civil proceeding for the recovery of a
debt).
51. See, e.g., In Re Strouse, 32 F. Cas. 261, 262 (D. Nev. 1871) (No. 13,548) ("[Tlhe
fourth amendment.., is applicable to criminal cases only" and not to a "civil" proceed-
ing under the revenue act which compelled production of books and papers of defend-
ant's business before the assessor.); In Re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 1869)
(No. 9,375) ("[T]his is a civil proceeding and in no wise does it partake of a criminal
prosecution .... Therefore, in this proceeding, the fourth amendment is not violated.").
52. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
53. Id. at 365.
54. Id. at 376 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 377.
19861
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basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protec-
tion against self-incrimination; it was the common-law right of a
man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indispen-
sable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. It was
firmly established in the common law as one of the bright fea-
tures of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to human progress. It was
not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. It belonged to all
men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. So much is clear
from any examination of history, whether slight or exhaustive.
The argument made to us has not the slightest basis in history. It
has no greater justification in reason. To say that a man sus-
pected of a crime has a right to protection against the search of
his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a
crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity. 6
According to Judge Prettyman, "the Fourth Amendment ap-
plied alike to health inspectors as well as to police of-
ficers - indeed to every and any official of government seeking
admission to any home in the country. ' '
5 7
Subsequently, in Camara v. Municipal Court,58 the Su-
preme Court overruled Frank pro tanto. Although a routine in-
spection of private property may be "a less hostile intrusion
than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumen-
talities of crime," ' the Camara Court refused to characterize
the fourth amendment interests in these inspection cases as
"merely peripheral" 60 as did the Court in Frank. In applying the
fourth amendment protections to a building code inspection,
Camara eroded the civil-criminal distinction and its role in the
application of the fourth amendment. Camara resulted in the
emergence of:
a three-point scale of values in granting warrants. First place in
the hierarchy is accorded to protection against criminal searches;
they are to be tested against an absolute standard of probable
cause. Second place is accorded to protection against administra-
tive searches of homes; they are to be subjected to the balancing
56. Id. at 377-78 (quoting District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17, aff'd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950)).
57. Id.
58. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
59. Id. at 530.
60. Id.
[Vol. 7:159
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test of public interest versus individual privacy. Third place is
reserved for protection against administrative searches of com-
mercial property; the balancing test is to be applied, with the pro-
viso that the privacy interest will be considered less weighty than
that of the home.'
Soon after Camara, Wyman v. James"2 came before the Su-
preme Court. There, the factual circumstances surrounding a
caseworker's visit to the home of a welfare recipient and her
child did not implicate the fourth amendment. The Court held
that the visit did not constitute a search 3 and yet, felt com-
pelled to hypothesize that if the visit had been a search, it would
have been constitutional under a reasonableness analysis." The
purpose of the home visitation was to determine if there were
any changes in the recipient's situation which might affect her
eligibility to continue to receive welfare benefits under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). 6 5 The
court emphasized that the visit was not forced or compelled, and
that denial of permission for the visit was not a criminal act.'6 If
consent were withheld, the visitation would not have taken place
and the recipient would no longer receive welfare benefits.6 7 The
fact that the visit was slightly "investigatory" in character was
insufficient, according to the Court, to call the protections of the
fourth amendment into play.6 8 A strong dissent, however, con-
strued the fourth amendment to govern "all intrusions by agents
of the public upon personal security."69
D. Determination of the Reasonableness of a Search
Regardless of the nature of the search at issue, it cannot be
valid under the fourth amendment unless it is reasonable. In
61. Denenberg, Administrative Searches and the Right to Privacy in the United
States, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. VOL. 169, 175 (1974).
62. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 169-75.
64. See infra notes 70-97 and accompanying text.
65. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 314.
66. Id. at 317. See also id. at 321.
67. Id. at 317-18, 325.
68. See id. at 317.
69. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15
(1968)).
1986]
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Agnello v. United States,70 the Supreme Court asserted that a
"search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unrea-
sonable and abhorrent to our laws. 71 Generally, warrantless
searches are held to be unreasonable;72 however, it is clear that
"no fixed formula for determining reasonableness exists. '73 As a
result, each case is decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Due to the lack of "independent conceptual development or sub-
stantive content" 74 given to the term "reasonableness" under the
fourth amendment, courts often utilize a balancing test to deter-
mine the "reasonableness" of a particular search. 75 A court
weighs "the need to intrude a home to make a search. .. against
the invasion of an individual's privacy interests which are neces-
sarily implicated by such a search.""6
Although a court may justify a particular governmental in-
trusion under the general standard of reasonableness when it
finds that a warrant is not required in a certain situation,
70. 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (the right to execute a search incidental to arrest does not
extend to search of a man's dwelling, several blocks from the place of his arrest, after the
offense has been committed and while he is in custody elsewhere).
71. Id. at 32.
72. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978) (The rule that war-
rantless searches are generally unreasonable applies to commercial premises as well as
homes.); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (In overruling Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) to the extent it sanctioned warrantless housing inspec-
tions, the Camara Court stated that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,
a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)
("[A] search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a war-
rant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property.").
73. Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections, 16 Hous.
L. REv. 399, 440 (1979). See also id. at n.277 (comparing cases which generally require a
warrant with other cases that simply adhere to a reasonableness test).
74. Id. at 444.
75. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (no formula
exists for determining reasonableness). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (In
upholding body cavity searches of inmates, the Court balanced the security interests of
the institution against the inmates' privacy interests.); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (In holding that the fourth amendment requires prior
judicial approval for domestic security surveillance, the Court balanced the duty of the
government and the potential danger to individual privacy.); Camara, 387 U.S. at 535
("In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable . . . the need for the in-
spection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.").
76. Evans, supra note 32, at 4 n.17.
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nevertheless,
the fourth amendment does not permit sanctioning government
intrusions because they seem reasonable in the broad, vernacular
sense of that word. Surely the amendment requires at a mini-
mum, . . .that the government [sic] need to make a particular
search or inspection must be balanced against the intrusion into
individual privacy that the search occasions, and that the pro-
posed intrusion be limited to the minimum justified by legitimate
governmental interests."
This balancing of interests has been essential in affording the
protection of the fourth amendment to persons subjected to
searches.7 8
The distinction between administrative searches and tradi-
tional searches results in different standards of "reasonable-
ness."7 9 In Wyman v. James, 0 reasonableness for fourth amend-
ment purposes was determined by the public interest in
protecting the dependent child, the procedural guidelines fol-
lowed, and the noncriminal nature of the search.8' Conversely,
Justice Marshall's dissent in Wyman proposed that the home
visit was indeed a search and, consequently, the imposition of a
traditional probable cause standard and warrant requirement
upon the caseworker was required by the fourth amendment.8
Of primary importance is the privacy interest; if the objectives
of the search can be achieved through less intrusive means, then
such means must be employed.8
Other factors which may be relevant in an inquiry into the
reasonableness of a search include: the scope of the intrusion,
the manner in which the search is conducted, the justification
for its initiation, and the location of the search.8" The possibility
of the exercise of unbridled discretion by the officials conducting
77. Comment, supra note 73, at 446 (emphasis added).
78. "[R]easonableness is the ultimate standard in balancing these competing inter-
ests." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1974); See also Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 50-69 and infra text accompanying notes 98-
108.
80. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
81. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
82. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 343.
84. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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the search, whether police officers or government officials, is also
relevant as to the reasonableness of the search and to the ques-
tion of the need for a warrant."
Some courts simply look to the purpose of the search to de-
cide whether the search is reasonable. For example, administra-
tive searches which served primarily to further the public wel-
fare are generally upheld as constitutionally valid. 6 In United
States v. Rea,87 the Supreme Court noted that a supervisory
visit to a probationer by a probation officer without a warrant
was permissible.8 8 Administrative searches which are part of a
governmental regulatory scheme may be upheld without a war-
rant if the purpose is to protect the health and welfare of its
citizens.89 Regulatory schemes generally apply to fire or housing
code inspections or federally licensed businesses.90 However, the
85. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). See infra text ac-
companying notes 160-75.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Martel, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (upheld deten-
tion of suitcases at airport without probable cause, but with a well-founded suspicion,
while awaiting the police narcotics dog); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.
1972) (upheld search of passenger's luggage at the airport as part of a screening inspec-
tion of all luggage and personal effects of passengers leaving Hawaii to prevent exporta-
tion of plants, pests and diseases).
87. 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982).
88. Id. at 387.
89. Martel, 654 F.2d at 1360-61. "Warrantless searches without probable cause have
been upheld when required as a condition for entering aircraft or public buildings as part
of a regulatory scheme to assure public safety." Id. at 1361 (citing as an example, Down-
ing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) upholding search of briefcase for weapons
and explosives pursuant to a rule which conditioned entry into a federal building upon
submission to such a search)).
90. There is a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement for "perva-
sively regulated businesses," United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (sale of
firearms) and for industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection," Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (sale of liquor). The Su-
preme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) explained:
These cases [Biswell and Colonnade] are indeed exceptions, but they represent
responses to relatively unique circumstances. Certain industries have such a his-
tory of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could
exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor (Colonnade) and
firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon
such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulation. . . . [B]usinessmen engaged in such federally licensed
and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade.
:. . The closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell
is the exception.
Id. at 313.
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"[diecisions of the Court ... have firmly established that where
an individual's privacy interests are at stake, such interests out-
weigh governmental interests in avoiding a warrant
requirement." 9'
Regardless of the nature of the search, consent is an excep-
tion to this general rule.2 Only in exigent circumstances93 such
as "hot pursuit"'94 does the government's interest outweigh an
individual's privacy interests. In Warden v. Hayden,95 the Su-
preme Court upheld a warrantless search of a home when the
police were in "hot pursuit" of an armed robber. The circum-
stances did not allow for delay. However, in Vale v. Louisiana,96
where the suspect was arrested outside of his home, the Court
invalidated a search of the inside of the house to determine if
anyone was at home. The possibility of obtaining a warrant
eliminated exigent circumstances as justification for the war-
91. Evans, supra note 32, at 23.
92. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (where three stolen checks
were discovered under the seat of a car after police officers had stopped the car and the
occupants had complied with a request to get out of the car and to search the car and
trunk, consent was valid); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (When
seeking to rely upon consent to justify lawfulness of a search, a prosecutor "has the bur-
den of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."); United
States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970)
(Warrantless inspectorial search of business premises is reasonable when entry is gained
with knowledge of its purpose and with manifestation of consent.); Darryl H. v. Coler,
585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (consent was
voluntarily given where mother assisted a caseworker in examining her child for signs of
abuse).
93. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (warrantless entry to fight a fire and
to remain thereafter in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the
blaze after it has been extinguished is constitutional); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963) (warrantless and unannounced entry into dwelling by police to prevent imminent
destruction of evidence is constitutional).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (where suspect
attempted to defeat an arrest based on probable cause which began in a public place by
retreating to a private place, the need to act quickly to prevent destruction of evidence
constituted "hot pursuit" and warrantless entry to arrest was justified); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (warrantless entry into house by police in hot pursuit of
armed robber is constitutional).
95. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
96. 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (where police officers were not in hot pursuit of a felon or
responding to an emergency, they were not authorized to search a dwelling without a
warrant). The Court declined to hold that suspect's arrest on the street outside his home
"can provide its own 'exigent circumstance' so as to justify a warrantless search of the
arrestee's house." Id. at 35.
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rantless search. 97
E. Administrative Searches versus Traditional Fourth
Amendment Searches
Not all searches involve instrumentalities of criminal activ-
ity; nor are they always conducted by police officers. Various
types of regulatory inspections have been referred to as "admin-
istrative" searches 8 and they may be conducted by government
officials. "Merely because the police are not searching with the
express purpose of finding evidence of crime, they are not ex-
empt from the requirements of reasonableness set down in the
Fourth Amendment." 9
In an early case involving an administrative search, Frank v.
Maryland,100 the Supreme Court held that an inspection by a
municipal health inspector did not constitute an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.' 0 ' Later,
Camara v. Municipal Court,'0 2 overruling Frank, held that a
warrantless administrative search of a personal residence (ab-
sent exigent circumstances) was a significant intrusion upon pri-
vacy interests and was a "search" within the meaning of the
amendment.'0 3 According to Camara, an administrative search is
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evi-
dence of crime;"'0 4 however, it cannot be justified on the ground
that it makes only minimal demands on the occupants."0 5
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., although the Supreme Court
found that a warrantless inspection of business premises vio-
lated the fourth amendment, it also suggested that "probable
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based.., on a
showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards
97. Id.
98. See cases cited supra notes 86, 89 and 90.
99. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 706, 484 P.2d 84, 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412,
416 (1971).
100. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For a discussion of Frank see supra text accompanying
notes 52-57.
101. Frank, 359 U.S. at 373-74 (Whittaker, J., concurring). For a full discussion of
Frank see supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
102. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
103. Id. at 534, 539-40.
104. Id. at 537.
105. Id. at 531-33.
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for conducting an .. .inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular [establishment].' "'06 The Court determined that the
imposition of a warrant requirement on Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA) officials would not impose any
serious burden on their inspections.'0 7 The Court also found that
"[ijf the government intrudes on a person's property, the pri-
vacy interest suffers whether the government's motivation is to
investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statu-
tory or regulatory standards. . . . [U]nless some recognized ex-
ception to the warrant requirement applies, ... [a warrant is
required] to conduct the inspection ....
III. E.Z. v. Coler
A. The Facts
In June 1982, parents and children who were subjects of in-
vestigations performed by the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) brought suit alleging that the "pat-
tern and practice" followed by DCFS in the course of investigat-
ing child abuse and neglect violated their fourth amendment
rights."0 9 These investigations entailed conducting limited war-
rantless searches of homes and physical examinations of the
bodies of suspected victims. 10
Subsequent to the events which culminated in plaintiffs'
suit, DCFS began using The Child Abuse and Neglect Investiga-
tions and Decisions Handbook."' Drafted by the American Bar
Association and Data Management Associates, this Handbook
provided guidelines for investigating reports of child abuse or
neglect. " 2 Although the investigations in question occurred prior
to the changes set forth in the July 1982 Handbook, plaintiffs
believed that current DCFS policy would permit similar searches
to continue." 3
106. 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538).
107. Id. at 316.
108. Id. at 312-13.
109. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1547-48 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
110. Id. at 1548.
111. Id. at 1548-49.
112. Id. at 1549.
113. Id. at 1550-51.
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In order to combat the growing problem of child abuse,""
DCFS operates a 24-hour hotline for reports of child abuse or
neglect.11 5 Hotline calls must meet the following requirements
before DCFS will begin an investigation of a particular situation:
1) A child less than 18 years of age must be involved;
2) The child must either have been harmed or be in danger of
harm or of a substantial risk of harm;
3) A specific incident or circumstance which suggests the
harm was caused by child abuse or neglect has been identified;
4) A parent or caretaker must be the alleged perpetrator of
neglect;
5) A parent or other caretaker, an adult family member, an
adult individual residing in the same house as the child, or the
parent's paramour must be the alleged perpetrator of abuse." 6
When these criteria are satisfied, the caseworker should visit
with the reported child victim within twenty-four hours.'1 7 In an
emergency situation, the investigation must begin immediately,
at any hour of the day or night." 8
In November 1980, S.H., mother of A.O., called the DCFS
hotline and reported that her husband had become violent." 9
S.H. recounted an incident during which, while A.O. was at-
tempting to defend his mother, A.O.'s father kicked him in the
stomach and struck him on the arm leaving a bruise. 20 Four
months later, A.O. was examined by a DCFS caseworker at
school, despite S.H.'s request that the interview not take place
there.' 21 After A.O. denied that his father abused him, the
caseworker proceeded to examine him and asked A.O. to lift his
shirt. 22 Whether A.O. was also required to lower his pants re-
114. During a recent 12-month period 71 children had lost their lives as the inno-
cent victims of child abuse in Illinois. Defendants-Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 3,
E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (No. 85-1611).
115. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1549.
116. The Child Abuse and Neglect Investigations and Decisions Handbook, Part
302.5(b) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
117. Id. pt. 302.5(g)(1).
118. Id. pt. 302.5(g)(2).
119. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1552.
120. Id.
121. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 11, E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (No. 85-1611).
122. Id.
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mains in dispute.' 3 The report of suspected child abuse of A.O.
by his father was later determined to be unfounded.'"4 Plaintiffs'
experts testified that the search had a harmful effect on the
child.'2 5
In January 1981, DCFS received an anonymous report that
E.Z., a two-year old female, had an enlarged vaginal opening and
bruises on her buttocks.'2 " Immediately, a caseworker was sent
to E.Z.'s home. After the caseworker had entered the home, he
proceeded to search the bedroom area, the refrigerator, the base-
ment and garage, without asking permission from E.Z.'s
mother.'2 7 The caseworker explained that the examination was
part of his job.'2 8 In the presence of E.Z.'s brother, the
caseworker then examined E.Z.'s vaginal opening and anal
area.'2 9 Subsequently, the report of abuse was also determined
to be without basis.' 30
In April 1981, according to an anonymous report to the
DCFS hotline, B.D., a ten-year old boy, had been beaten by his
father with a belt on the back and the buttocks.' 3 ' Pursuant to
this report, the DCFS caseworker examined B.D. at school. After
explaining to B.D. that he was there to find out if his father beat
him, the caseworker requested that B.D. pull down his pants.' 3
B.D. complied with the caseworker's request and the report was
found to be without substance.' 33
In June 1981, a neighbor called the DCFS hotline to report
that the D. children were not being adequately supervised.134
Recognizing that her refusal might result in her children being
taken away, the mother, Mary D., allowed the caseworkers to
enter her home. 135 In response to Mary D.'s concern about her
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at n.18.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1552.
132. Id.
133. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 10, Coler (No. 85-1611).
134. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1553.
135. Id. at 1557.
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rights to refuse to permit the caseworker to examine her chil-
dren and search the house, the worker explained that he could
contact the police and force her to allow him access to her house
and to examine the children.1 36
After looking around the house, the worker then lifted up
the shirts of Mary D.'s three children.1 37 Two of the allegations
concerning the children were that Mary D. had been tying Kevin
to his bed with a bathrobe sash and that Mary failed to meet
Tommy at the bus stop on one occasion. 38 Mary D. explained
that she would tie Kevin's foot to the bed because the eighteeen-
month old Kevin had repeatedly tried to climb out his second
floor window during his nap time.1 39 Subsequently, DCFS did
not take any further action regarding the allegations and did not
provide any follow-up services to the D. family.14 0
In May 1982, an anonymous caller reported to DCFS that
four-and-a-half-year old David K. had marks on his face from
being slapped by his father and that his home was unclean.1 41 A
caseworker arrived at the K. home and stated that his purpose
was to examine the children.1 42 Although the report only con-
cerned David, the caseworker also indicated the necessity for ex-
aminations of all the K. children, including David's brothers,
Nathan and Jonathan. In the course of the examination, David's
and Nathan's pants and underpants were pulled down and t-
shirts removed.' 43 Jonathan was examined with all his clothing
removed.1 4 4
During the interview, the K. family explained that part of
their disciplinary procedures included a few strokes with a
"happy stick. ' 145 After being disciplined, the children would put
the stick away and then discuss the problem with their par-
ents. 1 46 The caseworker informed the K. family that he would
136. Id.
137. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 15, Coler (No. 85-1611).
138. Id. at 14, n.23.
139. Id. at 15, n.25.
140. Id. at 15.
141. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1553.
142. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 16, Coler (No. 85-1611).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1553.
146. Id.
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report an occurrence of child abuse in their home and that a
follow-up visit would take place.4 7 More than a month later, a
follow-up worker contacted Mrs. K. During the follow-up
visit - despite the lack of subsequent reports of abuse or neg-
lect, the worker conducted new examinations of all three chil-
dren during which time David and Nathan were completely
stripped of their clothing. 4 8 Subsequently, after a petition seek-
ing custody was denied to DCFS, there were no more follow-up
visits and DCFS did not offer the K. family any further
services. 149
B. Procedural History
In June 1982, eight plaintiffs who were subjects of child
abuse investigations conducted by the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services filed a class action suit against the
Department, its directors, various administrators and
caseworkers.150 Plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief to enjoin
the DCFS from conducting searches of minor children without
the consent of their parents or without probable cause and from
conducting searches of the residences of such children and their
parents or legal guardians without consent, or a search warrant
issued upon probable cause. 5'
In August 1983, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a class. During De-
cember of 1983 and January and February of 1984, a prelimi-
nary injunction hearing was held. 52 After a review of the plead-
ings, opening statements, testimony of witnesses, final
arguments, memoranda, evidence and the court's appraisals of
the various witnesses and their credibility, the district court de-
nied plaintiffs' request for relief. 53
On March 12, 1985, the district court held that the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge the investigative procedures of the
147. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 16-17, Coler (No. 85-1611).
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id.
150. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1548.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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DCFS,' 5 ' that the procedures followed by the DCFS caseworkers
did not violate the fourth amendment rights of either the par-
ents or the children 5 ' and that no probable cause requirement
would be imposed upon the Department. 56 Emphasizing the im-
portance of the objectives of the DCFS - to safeguard the life
and health of child abuse victims - the court refused to im-
pose a warrant requirement on DCFS investigations. 5 ' After the
court also denied plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its denial of
class certification, plaintiffs filed motions to add parties, to
amend the complaint, and to amend the preliminary injunction
motion and order. 5 On April 9, 1985 the district court denied
plaintiffs' motions. Plaintiffs have since appealed from the dis-
trict court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.159
C. District Court's Analysis of the Searches
Viewing the DCFS procedures as official intrusions into the
home, the court considered whether fourth amendment protec-
tions were available to the plaintiffs.' 60 Characterizing the
DCFS' investigations as "administrative" searches,' the court
looked to Camara v. Municipal Court,62 for the standards ap-
plicable to such searches.
One such standard set forth in Camara was whether the of-
ficials responsible for a search had the opportunity to exercise
unbridled discretion. 163 If the opportunity for the exercise of un-
bridled discretion did exist, (as the Court determined it did in
Camara) a warrant would be necessary in order to protect fourth
amendment interests at issue.16 4 In order to determine whether
the DCFS workers did or could have exercised unbridled discre-
154. Id. at 1551.
155. Id. at 1555-56.
156. Id. at 1558.
157. Id.
158. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 2, Coler (No. 85-1611).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 269-80.
160. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1553.
161. Id. at 1553, 1555-56.
162. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For a full discussion of the Camara decision, see supra
text accompanying notes 58-61 and 102-05.
163. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
164. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1554.
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tion, the court looked to the Department's procedural
guidelines. 165
After examining the relevant DCFS procedures involving
the entry into the homes and examinations of the children, the
court concluded that DCFS workers were not free to exercise a
significant amount of discretion.' 66 The DCFS procedures pro-
vided sufficiently detailed guidelines as to the appropriate action
to be taken by the workers in conducting the body searches of
the children (if necessary) and searches of the residences.1 67 Ab-
sent unbridled discretion, the searches at issue would not re-
quire warrants under a Camara analysis. 6 8
The Coler court's analysis places a heavy reliance on Wy-
man v. James.'69 In Wyman, the Supreme Court declined to im-
pose a warrant requirement on a state caseworker for a child
welfare visit on the ground that the visit was not a "search" for
purposes of the fourth amendment.' 70 Alternatively, the Wyman
Court proposed that even if it had found the visit to be a search,
it would not have violated the fourth amendment. 17' The pur-
pose of the visit - the welfare of the dependent
child - justified the intrusion as reasonable under the fourth
amendment even in the absence of a warrant.1 72 The Court also
noted that Mrs. James did not risk criminal sanction by her
non-compliance with the social worker.'7 3 Similarly, in Coler, if
the plaintiffs had not complied with the caseworker's request to
enter the home, no criminal sanction would have been in-
voked.'1 4 As in Wyman, the court stressed the substantial gov-
ernmental interest in the purpose of the searches in question. 175
165. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
166. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556.
167. Id.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 210-21.
169. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
170. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317-18.
171. Id. at 318.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 317.
174. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556.
175. Id. at 1560.
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1. Consent
Under the traditional "totality of the circumstances" test,'76
the court addressed the issue of consent by the plaintiffs' par-
ents. The court's review of the entire record indicated that the
plaintiffs had voluntarily consented to the searches. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had not been coerced into admit-
ting the DCFS caseworkers into their homes or allowing the ex-
amination of their children. 17 7 Although there was testimony
that the plaintiffs were not aware of their right to refuse to ad-
mit the caseworkers, the court quickly disposed of this argument
by acknowledging that "in administrative searches . . . absent
coercion, knowledge of the right to refuse entry was not re-
quired" to validate consent. 17 8 The court determined that the
procedures followed by the DCFS workers prohibited the use of
any force or coercive measures.179 Despite plaintiffs' argument to
the contrary, the court found that the plaintiffs' consent to the
searches in question was valid. 80
2. Reasonableness of the Searches
Notwithstanding the finding that the plaintiffs consented to
the investigations, the court addressed the reasonableness of the
intrusions. Fourth amendment jurisprudence prohibits only un-
reasonable searches."8 ' Although the warrant requirement and
the probable cause standard are usually necessary to insure rea-
sonableness, if a warrant would frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search, it cannot be the sole measure of reason-
ableness. 182 Thus, reasonableness can only be ascertained by
considering the purpose of the search.18 3
By subordinating the privacy interests of the family to the
176. Id. at 1556 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
177. Id. at 1557.
178. Id. at 1556 (discussing United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970)).
179. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1557.
180. Id. at 1557-58.
181. See supra notes 9-49, 70-97 and accompanying text. See Coler, 603 F. Supp. at
1558.
182. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1558.
183. Id.
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government's purpose for the searches, that is, to protect depen-
dent children from harm, the court concluded that the entries
into the homes and the body searches of the children were rea-
sonable.184 In assessing the Department's objectives, the court
noted that "[t]he strong governmental interest in taking imme-
diate action to protect the child justifies the immediate investi-
gation and points up the fact that other delayed methods of in-
vestigation will likely hinder the governmental
purpose - protection of the dependent child.' 1 85
The court not only upheld the purpose of the searches as
reasonable, but also determined that the DCFS procedures pro-
vided sufficient safeguards for the fourth amendment rights of
the parents and children. 86 In the cases presented, the court
found that DCFS workers "acted reasonably in each situation to
accomplish their statutorily mandated function, the protection
of the dependent child."' 87 Consequently, the fourth amendment
did not prohibit the investigations by DCFS.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the
criteria necessary to obtain the preliminary injunction.'88 Ad-
dressing the substantive basis of the plaintiffs' claim, the court
determined that the DCFS investigations were searches which
thereby invoked the application of the fourth amendment.1 89
Nevertheless, the fact that the plaintiffs had consented to these
searches eliminated their constitutional claim. 190 However, the
court alternatively asserted that even without plaintiffs' consent,
it would not have found a fourth amendment violation on the
theory that the searches were reasonable and therefore not viola-
tive of the fourth amendment.'9"
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1560.
186. Id. at 1556, 1558.
187. Id. at 1552.
188. Id. at 1562.
189. Id. at 1553.
190. Id. at 1562.
191. Id. at 1558.
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IV. Analysis
A. An Official Intrusion Into the Home Requires the Protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment
In its memorandum opinion, the court in E.Z. v. Coler as-
serted that searches conducted by the DCFS workers implicated
the fourth amendment. 192 An official intrusion into the home
necessarily invokes the protection of the fourth amendment.1 93
However, the standards which insure this protection depend
upon the type of search involved.19'
In its analysis of the DCFS searches, the court looked to
Camara v. Municipal Court195 for the Supreme Court's exposi-
tion of fourth amendment standards governing administrative
searches. In Camara, although the Court found that a warrant-
less inspection of a residence pursuant to a municipal building
code violated the fourth amendment, it also suggested that the
degree of probable cause needed to support the issuance of a
warrant to carry out a housing code inspection was less than the
degree of probable cause needed to support a warrant in a crimi-
nal search.1 96 Probable cause to issue a warrant for an adminis-
trative search exists when reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for such an inspection are satisfied.'97 By
adhering to a lesser standard than that required for a criminal
search, the courts not only limit the protections granted by the
Constitution to searches which serve to discover evidence of
crime, but also ignore the value of the privacy interests of the
average citizen. Hence the protections afforded the victims of an
administrative search are less than those available with a crimi-
nal search. 198
192. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 50-69, 98-108.
195. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
196. Id. at 534-35.
197. Id. at 538.
198. Compare the standards for an administrative search in Camara with the tradi-
tional standard applicable to a criminal search. The Court in Camara reasoned that the
purpose of the warrant procedure was to guarantee that a decision to search private
property was justified by a reasonable governmental interest. Thus, reasonableness be-
comes the ultimate standard. However, before a warrant will issue for a criminal search,
the only standard applied is that of probable cause, i.e., probable cause that a crime was
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Clearly, however, physical examinations of children and
searches of their homes are distinguishable from regulatory fire
or housing code inspections. Nevertheless, the Coler court chose
to characterize the body searches of the children199 and the
searches of their homes °00 as "administrative." In Illinois Mi-
grant Council v. Pilliod,2 1 application of administrative search
standards as justification for searches of persons or their homes
was rejected.2 02 Pilliod involved Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) procedures 0 " which permitted the detention of
individuals based solely on a reasonable suspicion that they were
aliens and without any reason to believe that they were unlaw-
fully in the country. 04 The district court found that administra-
tive warrants do not authorize the search of a dwelling or seizure
of persons on the basis of less than probable cause.2 05 Applying
Camara standards to its analysis of the procedures of INS, the
court emphasized the intrusiveness and the personal nature of
the searches conducted. 06
committed and probable cause that evidence of the crime is at a particular location. As a
stricter test, probable cause assures the subject of a search more protection than mere
reasonableness.
199. See supra note 5.
200. See supra note 6.
201. 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
202. Id. at 1022-23.
203. Plaintiffs challenged INS'
systematic practice and policy of harassing. . . all persons of Mexican ancestry or
Spanish surname lawfully in the Northern District of Illinois.
. . . INS has statutory authority to interrogate aliens as to their right to re-
main in the United States, and to arrest aliens reasonably believed to be unlaw-
fully present in the United States. Pursuant to this power, INS conducts "area
control operations," which are law enforcement operations designed to detect
aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Area control operations are initi-
ated on the basis of information such as anonymous tips, reports from informants,
prior experience with employers, and review of employment records.
Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
Such operations were conducted at businesses, private homes, factories and airports.
In addition, INS had a policy of stopping individuals on the street in order to inquire
about their immigrant status. Id. at 1014-15.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1022. "The only time the Court has approved the issuance of administra-
tive warrants authorizing the search of dwellings was when it stated in Camara that
administrative warrants could be issued authorizing searches of dwellings for building
code violations pursuant to neutral area-wide inspection plan." Id. (citing Camara, 387
U.S. at 537-40).
206. Id. at 1023.
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[T]he balancing process mandated by Camara indicates that INS
is not justified in obtaining warrants to search homes, those areas
most highly protected by the fourth amendment, on the basis of
anything less than probable cause to believe that evidence of vio-
lations of the immigration laws will be found on the premises." 7
Pilliod distinguished "administrative" searches from the actual
searches of persons and their homes. Under this analysis, the
court in Coler should not have labeled the searches at issue as
"administrative."
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,208 although the Supreme Court
confirmed a modification of the traditional probable cause stan-
dard when such a standard would frustrate the government's
purpose for the search, it did not label the searches of students
at school as "administrative." The Court found that school offi-
cials need only reasonable grounds for suspicion that a student
is violating the law in order to execute a search.20 9 Although the
Coler court rejected the traditional probable cause standard as
applied to the searches in question, it neglected to apply such a
reasonable suspicion test in the alternative. The very nature of
the body searches demands more than the bare requirements of
the DCFS hotline calls to justify such a search.
B. Under an Administrative Search Analysis, the Court Up-
held the Constitutionality of DCFS Procedures
1. Unbridled Discretion
One of the reasons behind the Court's decision to impose a
warrant requirement in Camara was based upon the unbridled
discretion with which the inspectors were able to conduct their
building inspections.21 0 The potential for the exercise of unbri-
dled discretion arose from the following circumstances: the lack
of information which Mr. Camara had regarding the permissible
scope of the inspection; the inspector's authority to conduct the
search; and the harassment which might result from the absence
of the interposition of a neutral party between the citizen and
207. Id.
208. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
209. Id. at 341.
210. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). See supra text ac-
companying notes 163-68.
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the inspector.2 11 Applying the Camara analysis, the district
court in Coler found that the DCFS procedures 12 did not per-
mit the exercise of unbridled discretion by the caseworkers. 21 3
Whether these guidelines did in fact adequately restrict the dis-
cretion of the caseworkers is questionable; the families who were
subjected to the searches were not aware of the scope and extent
of the workers' authority in the performance of their duties.214
According to the DCFS procedures,213 searches may be
based solely on anonymous, vague, uncorroborated reports.216 All
that the caller must do is present a minimal amount of informa-
tion. The caller need not provide identification or state whether
his or her knowledge is firsthand; he or she must simply indicate
a specific instance of possible abuse or neglect of a child less
than eighteen years of age by an adult.21 7 Thus, the DCFS pro-
cedures are far from stringent and hardly provide for the protec-
tion of the family's privacy interests.
The DCFS workers are to conduct the examinations of the
children involved and the searches of their homes in a manner
"reasonably related to the reported allegation of abuse or neg-
lect. '21 8 Since the allegations are not detailed, the DCFS work-
ers could in fact exercise unbridled discretion in the perform-
ance of their duties. Basically, the hotline reports amount only
to a general suspicion of possible abuse or neglect; however, it is
on the basis of these reports that a visit takes place during
which DCFS workers may perform physical examinations of the
children and inspections of their homes.2 19 In addition, the
workers may, in their discretion, search the bodies of unreported
siblings.220 Thus, the possible exercise of unbridled discretion
was not precluded by the guidelines under which the DCFS
workers were to operate.
211. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 109-18.
213. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556.
214. Id. at 1557.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 109-18.
216. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 29, E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (No. 85-1611).
217. HANDBOOK, pt. 302.5(b).
218. Id. pt. 302.5(g)(3)(v).
219. Id. pts. 302.5(g)(1) and 302.5(g)(3)(v). See Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1549-50.
220. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 30, Coler (No. 85-1611).
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The court suggests that there was no opportunity for the
exercise of unbridled discretion simply because the DCFS
worker can resort to obtaining legal assistance if the parent re-
fused to cooperate.22" ' However, the fact that a parent may not
have been aware of the right to refuse to cooperate with the in-
vestigation at any point eliminated the protection against the
exercise of unbridled discretion which the court attributed to
the plaintiffs.
2. Standards For Consent to an Administrative Search
Are Less Stringent Than Standards for Consent to a Criminal
Search
Using a "totality of the circumstances" test,222 the court de-
termined that the plaintiffs consented to the home visits and ex-
aminations of the children.2 2 The various factors considered in-
cluded: the lack of coercion; voluntariness in the admittance of
the workers into the homes; and the existence of procedures
which prohibit the use of force by the caseworkers in gaining
entry and in conducting the actual search.224 If entry is refused
in response to the worker's explanation that he or she is author-
ized to investigate allegations of child abuse, the worker must
then seek a court order authorizing entry.223 Plaintiffs denied
the court's assertion that they had consented to the searches
since they did not know of their right to refuse to admit the
workers or their right to discontinue the investigation at any
time.226 However, the Supreme Court has held that the volunta-
riness of consent cannot be judged merely by the lack of knowl-
edge of the right to refuse entry. 2 Although this rule has been
applied to administrative as well as to criminal searches, ulti-
mately "the standards for consent to an administrative search
221. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556.
222. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973) ("[T]he question
whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all the circumstances.").
223. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556-57.
224. Id. at 1557-58.
225. Id. at 1557.
226. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
227. See cases cited supra note 92.
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are less stringent than the standards for consent to a criminal
search."228 Perhaps this distinction can be justified on the
ground that a finding of consent in a criminal search will have
far-reaching consequences if the suspect is brought to trial. The
ramifications of a determination of consent in a criminal search
will affect the proceedings subsequent to the search. Neverthe-
less, due to the privacy interests at stake, consent in an adminis-
trative search situation must also be held up to a carefully de-
fined standard. However, in Coler, the court quickly disposed of
the consent issue.
The court failed to consider the consent issue in necessary
detail - specifically, the possibility of coercion. It is well estab-
lished that "the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force." 29 Evidence of intimidation, co-
ercion or misrepresentation must be among the factors consid-
ered in a court's determination of consent in the context of an
administrative search.230 Although the court correctly noted that
knowledge of the right to refuse a search alone is not determina-
tive of the consent issue, nevertheless, it remains a relevant fac-
tor to be considered as part and parcel of the totality of the
circumstances.
The arrival of a caseworker at the door explaining that he is
authorized to physically examine a child's body and inspect the
home for evidence of child abuse based upon a report made to
the DCFS hotline is undeniably a stressful and potentially coer-
cive situation.23' The various explanations as to why the plain-
tiffs complied with the requests of the DCFS workers indicated
impliedly coercive situations. A few examples of these explana-
tions are illustrative: the parent felt that she "had to do what
[the caseworker] told me to;" '232 they were "thunderstruck" at
228. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556; United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
229. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
230. Id. at 233.
231. This is especially true if the report turns out to be unfounded. See, e.g., Plain-
tiffs-Appellants' Brief at 10 n.15, 11 n.18, Coler (indicating the harmful effects on the
suspected (but not proven) victims of child abuse).
232. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1557.
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the situation; 33 they felt that they "had no choice; 2 3 and they
thought that if they did not cooperate DCFS would take the
children away.235 One caseworker had asserted that he could get
the police and then force the parents to allow him to look
through the house and take the children away.23 6 Although these
responses resulted in plaintiffs' consent to the workers' entries
into their homes, they reflected some degree of coercion which
was not acknowledged by the court. Even if the sense of coercion
were more imagined than real since DCFS workers were not au-
thorized to use force to gain entry into the homes, it is, never-
theless, a factor that requires consideration if the court is to en-
gage in a complete analysis of the consent issue.
Consent must be voluntarily and freely given.237 If there is
any coercion involved, there can be no valid consent.238 In
Bumper v. North Carolina,39 the Court held that "[w]hen a law
enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to
resist the search. '240 Clearly, it follows that there can be no valid
consent in such a situation. Although Bumper involved a crimi-
nal search and a police officer, its theory can be analogized to a
noncriminal situation. According to the rationale of Bumper, if
the DCFS caseworkers asserted that they would procure a search
warrant if they were not permitted to enter the home, this situa-
tion in its totality can be deemed sufficiently coercive as to elim-
inate the possibility of consent given freely and voluntarily. At a
minimum, the possibility of coerciveness under these circum-
stances deserved more than a cursory glance by the court.
In United States v. Thriftimart, Inc.,24 1 the Court distin-
guished an analysis of consent in a criminal search from that in
an administrative search.2 2 The Court upheld a warrantless in-
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
238. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.
239. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
240. Id. at 550.
241. 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
242. Id. at 1009.
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spection of business premises as reasonable because entry was
gained not by force or misrepresentation, but with knowledge of
the inspector's purpose and manifestation of assent.2 43 Accord-
ing to the Court, in an administrative inspection a citizen is not
likely to be surprised; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
inspection is inevitable and nothing is gained by demanding that
the inspector obtain a warrant.4 For these reasons, the Court
proposed to treat consent in criminal searches and administra-
tive searches differently. However, Coler is clearly distinguisha-
ble from a routine inspection performed by the FDA. Most par-
ents would be quite surprised to find a DCFS caseworker at
their door seeking entrance to their homes in order to examine
their children and look around the house. Furthermore, a visit
from a DCFS caseworker is not inevitable.245 Finally, parents do
have something very real to gain by demanding a war-
rant - they can protect their privacy and force the caseworkers
to seek more than bare allegations of abuse before coming to
their homes. Thus, even if the court refused to apply the stan-
dards for consent to a criminal search to the facts in Coler, these
facts required something more than the standards applied to a
routine inspection of business premises.
3. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Only Unreasonable
Searches
a. DCFS Searches Were Unreasonable Under the Fourth
Amendment
In its prohibition against unreasonable searches, the fourth
amendment leaves open the possibility that reasonable searches
may be constitutionally valid.246 Although most courts usually
engage in a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a
particular search, 47 in Coler, the district court simply looked to
243. Id. at 1010.
244. Id. at 1009.
245. Compare Coler with Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Visits are provided
for by statute (N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 134, 134-a (McKinney 1983)) as a condition to
continuing receipt of public assistance.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 181-90. See also supra notes 70-97 and
accompanying text.
247. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Go-Bart
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the purpose of the search and thereby found the searches to be
constitutional.2 48 The court justified this approach to the reason-
ableness test by characterizing the searches as "administra-
tive."" If courts always resorted to a "purpose-oriented" ap-
proach to reasonableness, every search, regardless of how it was
conducted, could be saved by advocating a noble purpose with
the public interest at heart. The extent and the intrusiveness of
the searches demand a more stringent analysis involving more
than a cursory evaluation of the worthy public interest in the
health and well-being of the dependent children. Instead, the
court virtually ignored the tension between the state's interest in
protecting the children from abuse in the home and the family's
interest in the privacy of the home and the child's interest in his
personal security.
In summarily disposing of the plaintiffs' claim to familial
privacy, the court asserted the state's duty to protect dependent
children from harm at the hands of a parent or guardian.2 50 Af-
ter addressing the state's interest, the court upheld the purpose
behind the searches.2 51 Rather than proceed with its analysis,
the court simply ended its scrutiny of the searches. This ap-
proach serves only to trivialize the interest of the family in its
privacy and its desire and right to be free from governmental
intrusion into the home.252
The court neglects to consider the family's right to privacy
in the home. This right to privacy "is not conditioned upon the
objective, the prerogative or the stature of the intruding officer.
His uniform, badge, rank, and the bureau from which he oper-
ates are immaterial. It is immaterial whether he is motivated by
the highest public purpose or by the lowest personal spite. 25 3
Thus, whatever the nature of the search, the privacy interest is
present and must be addressed in the court's analysis.
In light of the significant interests involved, the Coler court
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
248. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1558.
249. Id. at 1556-58.
250. Id. at 1559.
251. Id. at 1559-60.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 28-97.
253. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
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had a duty to utilize a true balancing test weighing "the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails."254 The
state's interest is readily acknowledged. The state does have a
need to search; it has an obligation to protect dependent chil-
dren from harm.255 Nevertheless, the court cannot simply ignore
the second element of the balancing test - the invasion which
the search entails. The privacy interests of the parents and chil-
dren have clearly been invaded by the searches in question. For
the children, in addition to the obvious embarrassment resulting
from the removal of their clothing and a physical examination
by a caseworker (a stranger to the children), evidence was sub-
mitted that these searches may have a long-term negative im-
pact on the children mentally.2 56 It cannot be doubted that a
nude physical inspection is a serious and significant intrusion
into the privacy of an individual - adult or child.
In addition to the privacy interest of the children in their
bodily security, the family's interest in the privacy of the home
is at stake.25  It is essential that the court recognize "[t]he fun-
damental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child [and that this interest] does not
evaporate simply because they have not been [or are suspected
of not having been] model parents. 258
Due to the weighty significance of the interests at stake, a
resolution of the conflict appears almost impossible. However,
because it is the court's duty to provide a resolution, each of the
interests, including those of the parents and children, deserves
careful consideration by the court - not cursory acknowledge-
ment and hasty dismissal.
b. Reliance on Wyman v. James
Although the court purports to be guided by Wyman v.
James, 259 the only thing it seems to have followed is its conclu-
sion - a warrant requirement will not be imposed. Despite
254. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
255. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475, 181 A.2d 751, 758 (1962).
256. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 10 n.15, 11 n.18, Coler (No. 85-1611).
257. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972).
258. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. See also id. at 754 n.7.
259. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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their similar holdings, however, there is an obvious and signifi-
cant distinction between Wyman and Coler. In Wyman, the Su-
preme Court determined that the home visit by a social worker
was not a search.26 In Coler, however, the district court found
that the visits by DCFS workers were searches and, therefore,
did involve the possibility of a constitutional violation.26' This
distinction requires the court to engage in a balancing test which
weighs all the interests affected - not only the interests of the
state.
The Court's analysis in Wyman gave short shrift to the pri-
vacy interests of Mrs. James;2 62 and the Coler court followed this
analysis, without acknowledging, much less undertaking, its duty
to examine the privacy interests of the parents and their chil-
dren.2 63 An examination of these interests is essential to the per-
formance of a true balancing test for reasonableness; without
such an inquiry there can be no balancing. In essence, the
court's purported balancing test becomes a pretext to a purpose-
oriented approach. The inquiry goes no further than the purpose
of the search at issue. If the purpose is a legitimate one, the
court's analysis ends. This type of analysis can only have delete-
rious effects on the constitutional rights of individuals and their
families; it severely diminishes the protections granted under
the Constitution.
The fact that the Court in Wyman refused to import any
real significance to Mrs. James' privacy interests can be rational-
ized to the extent that it did not find a "search" and, therefore,
was not required to deal with the fourth amendment considera-
tions. Conversely, in Coler, the court recognizes that various
searches were in fact executed and that the fourth amendment
was indeed implicated. Thus, the district court's analysis must
necessarily continue beyond that of the Court in Wyman and
include a comprehensive consideration of all the interests impli-
cated by the searches which took place. Then, and only then,
can the court determine if these rights and interests guaranteed
by the fourth amendment have been violated. Logically, the
260. Id. at 317.
261. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1553.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69 and 169-75.
263. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1559.
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court cannot begin to determine whether there has been a con-
stitutional violation if it ignores or does not appreciate the mag-
nitude of the interests at stake. Unquestionably, the court's
analysis falls short of that which the fourth amendment
demands.
c. A Warrant Requirement Would Not Frustrate the Pur-
pose of the DCFS Investigations
The court indicated that if the imposition of a warrant re-
quirement would frustrate or hinder the purpose of DCFS inves-
tigations, it would not require one.26 Due to the delicate nature
of the problem of child abuse in the home, the court attributed
an "emergency" quality to DCFS investigations.265 However, this
description can be misleading. All reported allegations of abuse
are not emergencies; in fact, some reports are subsequently re-
vealed to have no basis at all.2 e6 The DCFS procedures them-
selves distinguish between emergency and non-emergency re-
ports of abuse or neglect.2 67 Therefore, the emergency rationale
of the Coler court did not in itself justify a refusal to afford par-
ents and their children traditional fourth amendment standards
of protection.
The Coler court insisted that the need for immediate action
to protect the suspected victims supported the reasonableness of
the searches as they are presently conducted.68 While this anal-
ysis is supportable, it presents only one side of the issue. The
court failed to adequately address the substantial interest of the
family in freedom from governmental intrusion. Once the fam-
ily's interest is acknowledged, the argument against imposition
of a warrant requirement or a probable cause standard is weak-
ened considerably. The imposition of a warrant does not in any
way belittle the importance of the objectives of DCFS in pro-
264. Id. at 1560.
265. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[H]istory reveals
that the initial steps in the erosion of individual rights are usually excused on the basis
of an 'emergency' or threat to the public."). Id. at 502 (Oakes, J., concurring and quoting
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972)
(Mansfield, J., concurring)).
266. See supra notes 80-147 and accompanying text.
267. HANDBOOK, pts. 302.5(g)(1) and 302.5(g)(2).
268. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1559-60.
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tecting victims of child abuse, rather, it serves both to recognize
the substantial interests at stake and to protect the interests of
everyone involved.
V. Conclusion
In E.Z. v. Coler, the court characterized the physical exami-
nations of suspected victims of child abuse and the inspection of
their homes as "administrative" searches and thus refused to ac-
cord the proper degree of significance to the interests of the
family in its privacy and in the integrity of the family unit. Con-
sequently, the court simply rubber stamped the commendable
objective of the DCFS to protect victims of child abuse as suffi-
cient justification for refusing to impose a warrant or probable
cause standard upon their investigations. Instead of engaging in
a traditional balancing test of the interests at stake in order to
determine the reasonableness of a search, the court perfunctorily
looked at the importance of the purpose of the search, upheld its
validity and consequently refused to find a fourth amendment
violation. The traditional deference given to the sanctity of one's
person and home appears to have vanished from the analysis of
a search under the fourth amendment. All that remains is a
question: What protection does the Constitution provide against
searches of a noncriminal and non-regulatory nature?
Addendum
On September 9, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in E.Z. v. Coler.26 9
The court of appeals fully expounded on the standard of re-
view applicable to a review of a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. Although the court raised the weighty issues overlooked by
the district court, 70 it refrained from suggesting any standards
269. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub nom. B.D. by C.D. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986). On appeal, plaintiff, E.Z., was no longer before the
court.
270. On appeal, the court addressed only the body searches.
Although the plaintiffs in B.D. by C.D., continued to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the home search .... those plaintiffs actually subjected to the home search
are no longer before the court. Therefore, the court can only address the DCFS
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or making any determinations to assist the district court in the
subsequent stages of litigation. The court readily acknowledged
that which the lower court tried to ignore:
a final resolution of [the fourth amendment) issue will require the
reconciliation of very fundamental constitutional values: the pri-
vacy rights of the child; the privacy rights of the family in the
important area of childrearing; and the obligation and right of re-
sponsible government to deal effectively with the stark reality of
child abuse in our society .... 17
However, while readily raising the constitutional interests at
stake, the court, nevertheless, quickly abdicated any responsibil-
ity "to accomplish a definitive reconciliation of these competing
constitutional value concerns. "272
Although the court undertook a true balancing test of the
conflicting interests, it again directed its discussion to the dis-
trict court's propriety in denying the plaintiffs' preliminary in-
junction. The court found that the district court's denial of the
injunction was proper. It did not, however, reach this conclusion
without much reservation and skepticism about the investigative
procedures employed by the DCFS. The court was quick to ad-
mit the imperfections of DCFS procedures: "Precision in the
identification of the child abuse situation - no less than in the
treatment of the perpetrator and the victim - is not yet, un-
fortunately, an achievement of our society. 273 Due to the deli-
cate nature of the inquiry into child abuse in the home, "[tihe
state caseworker.., has an important responsibility not to dis-
rupt salutary familial relationships through extensive interroga-
tions. ' 27 Thus, "because over 60% of the reported cases of child
abuse are subsequently labeled unfounded, '[in a number of in-
stances,... the only family crisis which exists is that created by
Department intervention.' ",271
Repeatedly referring to standards governing its review of a
policy which permits routine examinations of the child's body for evidence of
abuse or neglect.
Id. at 896 n.2.
271. Id. at 894-95.
272. Id. at 895.
273. Id. at 902.
274. Id.
275. Id. (quoting HANDBOOK at 10).
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preliminary injunction, the court asserted that "we cannot defin-
itively say that the district judge is wrong. "276 Ironically, al-
though the court bent over backwards to adhere strictly to the
standards of review and thereby avoided arriving at a conclu-
sion, it repeatedly voiced its skepticism regarding the reasona-
bleness of DCFS procedures. "We are not convinced [at this
stage in the litigation] that the Handbook, as it now exists, en-
sures that searches will always be reasonable. '2 77 The court,
therefore, unequivocally expressed its misgivings about the
Handbook procedures; however, it was willing to wait and see if
its misgivings were answered at trial.
2 78
In its discussion, the court of appeals repeated the concern
of the lower court that "it is likely that some child abuse would
go undetected and some innocent lives unprotected. 2 79 Both the
district court and the court of appeals failed, however, to ade-
quately consider the harm which results from the denial of the
preliminary injunction against DCFS. Since more than one-half
of the reports of child abuse are ultimately unfounded, 80 the
risk of harm is actually greater with a denial of the preliminary
injunction. Without the injunction, more children will be sub-
jected to unreasonable and potentially unconstitutional physical
examinations and searches of their homes. These practices could
pose a threat of destruction for the family and may have long-
term negative effects on the mental and emotional stability of all
the subjects of child abuse investigations.
The court of appeals sent E.Z. v. Coler back to the trial
court for a resolution of the conflict of the critical constitutional
interests at stake without the benefit of guidelines. Due to the
importance of the interests involved in the area of child
abuse - the state's interest in protecting dependent children
from harm and the respect for the dignity of the child and his
family - the court of appeals had a duty to provide some assis-
tance to the trial court. Time is an important factor in the reso-
lution of this case for the suspected victims regardless of the
276. Id. at 903.
277. Id. at 904.
278. Id.
279. Id. (quoting E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1563 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
280. Id. at 903.
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truth of the reported allegations. If the allegations are true, the
investigation cannot be delayed - a child's life may be at
stake. If the report turns out to be untrue, both the child and
the family will have suffered needless embarrassment and hu-
miliation. The negative impact of the physical examinations may
have far-reaching consequences for both the children and their
parents. Thus, these constitutional issues must be resolved as
soon as possible.
If the court of appeals had taken a firmer stand on the is-
sues involved, the interests at stake would be better served in
subsequent stages of litigation.
Carol DiSalvatore
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